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I. Introduction 
This Article summarizes important developments in Montana oil and gas 
law that occurred between August 1, 2015 and July 31, 2016.  Part II deals 
with legislative and regulatory developments, and Part III addresses 
common law developments in both State and Federal courts. 
II. Legislative and Regulatory Developments 
A. State Legislative Developments 
The 64th Session of the Montana Legislature adjourned, sine die, on 
April 28, 2015.1  Thus, there were no new statutory developments during 
the timeframe of this Article. The Legislature will reconvene January 2, 
2017.2 
B. State Regulatory Developments 
Effective April 23, 2016, the definitions of “stripper well bonus” and 
“stripper well exception” pertaining to crude oil were changed to apply to 
oil prices at $54 per barrel. The prior definitions applied to oil at $38 per 
barrel.3 
III. Judicial Developments 
A. Montana Supreme Court Cases 
1. Interstate Explorations, LLC v. Morgen Farm and Ranch, Inc. 
In Interstate Explorations, LLC v. Morgen Farm and Ranch, Inc.,4 the 
Montana Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s denial of a motion to 
dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Landowner Morgen Farm 
and Ranch, Inc. (“Morgen”) leased its mineral rights to a predecessor of 
                                                                                                                 
 1. 2015 Regular Session, MONTANA LEGISLATURE (MAR. 22, 2016, 11:28 AM) 
http://leg.mt.gov/css/Sessions/64th.defualt.asp, (last visited Sept. 20, 2016). 
 2. 65th Legislature-Tentative 2017 Session Calendar-Adopted May 19, 2016 by 
Legislative Council, MONTANA LEGISLATURE (May 24, 2016), 
http://leg.mt.gov/content/sessions/65th/2017sessioncalendar052416.pdf (last visited Sept. 
20, 2016). 
 3. MONT. ADMIN. R. 42.25.1801. 
 4. 2016 MT 20, ¶ 1, 382 Mont. 136, 137, 364 P.3d 1267, 1267 (Mont. 2016). 
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Interstate Explorations, LLC (“Interstate”), which subsequently acquired 
the leasehold rights and drilled a well on Morgen’s property.5 After Morgen 
refused to execute an easement needed to install power lines to operate the 
well, Interstate filed suit in the District Court of the Seventh Judicial 
District, Wibaux County, seeking a declaration that Morgen had wrongfully 
denied the easement and affirming Interstate’s rights in the property.6 
Morgen asserted counterclaims alleging hydrocarbon spills on the property 
and requested damages.7 Interstate responded by filing a motion to dismiss 
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, claiming Morgen had failed to 
exhaust its administrative remedies before seeking damages.8 The trial 
court denied Interstate’s motion to dismiss.9   
On appeal, Interstate argued that the District Court lacked subject matter 
jurisdiction to hear Morgen’s counterclaims for damages since Morgen was 
required to first exhaust administrative remedies under the Surface Owner 
Damage and Disruption Compensation Act (“Act”).10 In other words, 
Interstate argued that the Montana Administrative Procedure Act governed 
Morgen’s claims, and that the proper course was to go before the Montana 
Board of Oil and Gas Conservation (“Board”).11   
The Supreme Court of Montana disagreed, finding that the Board has no 
direct enforcement authority pursuant to the Act’s dispute resolution 
process.12 Additionally, the Court pointed out that even if the Board did 
have such authority, the Act provides that it is not an exclusive remedy.13 
The Court therefore affirmed the District Court’s denial of Interstate’s 
motion to dismiss Morgen’s counterclaims for damages.14 
2. Wicklund v. Sundheim 
In Wicklund v. Sundheim, the Montana Supreme Court heard an appeal 
of a decision by the Richland County District Court in which it interpreted 
an oil and gas royalty reservation contained in a 1953 deed.15 The original 
grantors in the deed were the Teisingers, now represented by Wicklund, 
                                                                                                                 
 5. Id. ¶ 3, 382 Mont. at 137, 364 P.3d at 1267. 
 6. Id. ¶ 4, 382 Mont. at 137-38, 364 P.3d at 1267. 
 7. Id. ¶ 5, 382 Mont. at 137-38, 364 P.3d at 1267. 
 8. Id.  
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. ¶ 9, 382 Mont. at 138, 364 P.3d at 1268. 
 11. Id. ¶ 9, 382 Mont. at 138, 364 P.3d at 1269. 
 12. Id. ¶ 13, 382 Mont. at 140, 364 P.3d at 1269. 
 13. Id. ¶ 14, 382 Mont. at 140, 364 P.3d at 1270. 
 14. Id. 
 15. 2016 MT 62, ¶ 1, 383 Mont. 1, 2, 367 P.3d 403, 406. 
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trustee, and the original grantees were the Sundheims, now represented by 
their heirs.16 A dispute between the parties arose when an oil and gas 
developer began exploration and development on the Sundheims’ property 
around 2012 but refused to issue payment until the successors to the parties 
to the 1953 deed either signed a stipulation of interest, or filed a quiet title 
action asking a court to interpret the deed’s royalty reservation.17  
Wicklund then filed suit to quiet title and asked the court to interpret the 
following reservation:  
First parties reserve unto themselves three-fifths (3/5ths) of Land 
owners [sic] oil, gas and mineral royalties and three-fifths 
(3/5ths) of any and all delay rentals on present and existing oil 
and gas leases now of record against the lands herein described; 
the conveyance herein is made subject to such oil and gas leases 
and any and all assignments now of record.18 
The trial court acknowledged that the reservation language was 
ambiguous and heard testimony from an English professor who opined that 
the phrase “on present and existing oil and gas leases” modified both 
“royalties” and “delay rentals.”19 After a two day trial, the court resolved 
the ambiguity in favor of the grantees and held that the reservation of 3/5ths 
of the royalty applied only to the lease in existence at the time of the deed.20 
Wicklund appealed. 
While the Supreme Court of Montana agreed that the reservation 
language was ambiguous, it disagreed with the trial court’s failure to 
consider extrinsic evidence in light of that ambiguity.21 Specifically, 
although the lease in place at the time of the 1953 deed was released in 
1958, the successors to the original parties shared royalties from subsequent 
leases in the 3/5ths and 2/5ths proportions set out in the royalty reservation 
cited above and entered into a royalty stipulation as to this split in the 
1970s.22 Finding this evidence highly probative, especially when construed 
in light of the principle set forth in MCA § 70-1-516 of resolving 
reservations in favor of grantors, the Court interpreted the reservation in 
                                                                                                                 
 16. Id. ¶ 3, 383 Mont. at 3, 367 P.3d at 406. 
 17. Id. ¶ 5, 383 Mont. at 4, 367 P.3d at 406. 
 18. Id. ¶ 3, 383 Mont. at 3, 367 P.3d at 406. 
 19. Id. ¶ 11, 383 Mont. at 5, 367 P.3d at 407. 
 20. Id. ¶ 12, 383 Mont. at 5, 367 P.3d at 407. 
 21. Id. ¶ 27, 383 Mont. at 9, 367 P.3d at 410. 
 22. Id. ¶¶ 30-31, 383 Mont. at 10-11, 367 P.3d at 410-11. 
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favor of the original grantors and remanded with instructions to enter a 
judgment quieting title to Wicklund.23 
B. Federal Courts 
1. Montana Environmental Information Center v. U.S. Bureau of Land 
Management 
In Montana Environmental Information Center v. U.S. Bureau of Land 
Management,24 the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
reversed a decision by the Federal District Court for the District of Montana 
that held environmental groups do not have standing to challenge the 
Bureau of Land Management’s sale of oil and gas leases in Montana.25 At 
issue was whether the environmental groups could demonstrate a “concrete 
and redressable injury.”26 The Ninth Circuit found that “recreational and 
aesthetic interests . . . may establish actual injury to the extent such interests 
would be concretely harmed by the challenged governmental action.”27 
Thus, the Court explained, the trial court erred by not considering that the 
development of the leases could cause harm to the surface.28 The Court 
remanded to allow the district court to consider which leases the Appellants 
had standing to challenge, as well as any actual injuries stemming from the 
surface harms caused by lease development.29  
2. Energy Investments, Inc. v. Greehey & Co., Ltd. 
In Energy Investments, Inc. v. Greehey & Co., Ltd., the Federal District 
Court for the District of Montana, Great Falls Division, Magistrate Judge 
Johnston presiding, granted in part and denied in part a motion for summary 
judgment regarding the interpretation of an area of mutual interest (“AMI”) 
agreement.30 In 2012, the parties entered into an AMI agreement in which 
Greehey agreed to pay Energy Investments (“Energy”) $50.00 per net 
mineral acre for any oil and gas leases Greehey acquired within the AMI 
and $75.00 per net mineral acre for any leases Energy acquired within the 
                                                                                                                 
 23. Id. ¶¶ 24-28, 383 Mont. at 8-10, 367 P.3d at 409-410. 
 24. 615 Fed. Appx. 431 (9th Cir. 2015). 
 25. Id. at 432. 
 26. Id.  
 27. Id.  
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. at 433. 
 30. No. CV 14-13-GF-JTJ, WL 6034028, *1 (D. Mont. Oct. 15, 2015), appeal filed, No. 
16-35256, 2015 (9th Cir. April 6, 2016). 
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AMI.31 The parties further agreed that Energy would assign any leases it 
acquired to Greehey, and Greehey would assign to Energy an overriding 
royalty interest in the leases Greehey acquired.32 Greehey intended to sell 
and assign all leases obtained within the AMI to Apache, but Apache 
refused to accept the proffered leases because they didn’t include certain 
terms.33 Since Greehey could not sell the leases, it failed to pay Energy.34  
Energy filed suit and moved for summary judgment as to the unpaid 
“prospect fees” for the acquired oil and gas leases, as well as an overriding 
royalty interest on those leases.35 
Greehey argued that it owed a prospect fee only for those acquired acres 
with five year lease terms and a two year option to renew, contending that 
this requirement was evident from the parties’ discussions and the language 
of the AMI Agreement.36 Initially, Greehey also argued that Energy had 
never received authorization to purchase leases for more than $200 per acre 
and that it was not obligated to pay for leases that did not have five-
year/two-year term.37 Greehey later conceded that one of its agents 
authorized Energy to purchase leases for more than $200 per acre, and 
Energy thus contended that Greehey had waived any defenses it may have 
had as to its five-year/two year term claim. 38  
The Court found the contract unambiguous and entered summary 
judgment for Energy, finding that Greehey owed it approximately three 
million dollars in unpaid fees, but it denied the motion as to certain 
remaining leases, finding that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to 
whether Greehey had waived its defenses as to the five-year/two-year term 
claim.39 
3. Elk Petroleum, Inc. v. Rocky Mountain Regional Director 
In Elk Petroleum, Inc. v. Rocky Mountain Regional Director,40 the 
Federal District Court for the District of Montana, Billings Division, Judge 
Watters presiding, granted a motion for summary judgment in favor of the 
Rocky Mountain Regional Director for the Bureau of Indian Affairs 
                                                                                                                 
 31. Id. at *2.   
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. at *1. 
 34. Id.  
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. at *3. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. at *4. 
 39. Id. 
 40. No. 14-30-BLG-SPW, 2016 WL 676362 (D. Mont. Feb. 18, 2016). 
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(“Director”), upholding an oil and gas lease on lands owned by the Crow 
Tribe. 
In 2008, the Crow Tribe of Indians executed a lease to Elk Petroleum 
(“Elk”).41 Pursuant to the Indian Mineral Development Act of 1982, the 
Crow Tribe then submitted the lease to the Bureau of Indian Affairs 
(“BIA”) for its approval.42 Initially, the Director indicated that he would 
approve the lease in thirty days and highlighted some concerns.43 The 
parties responded to these concerns by submitting a letter of clarification.44 
Shortly thereafter, the Director sent a second letter stating: “This is our 
approval of the [lease].”45 This letter also stated that the prior letter of 
clarification would be made part of the lease.46 The Director’s letter 
indicated several other times that the lease was approved.47 
A dispute arose when the BIA sent invoices to Elk to collect its first year 
rent and bonus.48 Elk refused payment, claiming that there was no binding 
lease between Elk and the Crow Tribe.49 Through the administrative 
appellate process, the Board of Indian Appeals found that the lease had 
been unambiguously accepted and affirmed the Director’s decision to 
cancel the lease due to lack of payment.50 
In the District Court, both parties moved for summary judgment.51 
Applying an arbitrary, capricious, or abuse of discretion standard of review, 
the District Court affirmed the Board of Indian Appeals’ decision, granted 
the Director’s motion for summary judgment, and ordered Elk to pay 
approximately $870,000 (amount owed plus interest).52 
4. Murray v. Billings Garfield Land Co. 
In a most peculiar case, Murray v. Billings Garfield Land Co., the 
Federal District Court for the District of Montana, Billings Division, Judge 
Watters presiding, was asked to determine whether dinosaur fossils are part 
                                                                                                                 
 41. Id. at *1. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id.  
 44. Id. 
 45. Passim. 
 46. Passim.  
 47. Id. at *2. 
 48. Id.  
 49. Id.  
 50. Id. at *3. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. at *4-5. 
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of the surface or the mineral estate.53 Beginning in 2005, multiple dinosaur 
fossils were discovered on the ranch owned and operated by the Murrays.54 
The estimated value of the fossils was in the millions and included two 
dinosaurs that were apparently locked in battle when they died (a rarity), a 
T. Rex, and a Triceratops skull.55 The Murrays, who own the surface of the 
ranch but share fractional interests in the minerals underlying the ranch 
with the defendants, filed suit seeking a declaratory judgment that the 
fossils were part of the surface estate.56 The Seversons counterclaimed, 
arguing that the fossils should be classified as minerals.57 Both parties 
offered expert testimony regarding the composition of these specific 
fossils.58  
Noting that the question is not whether the item falls within the scientific 
definition of a mineral or is “rare and exceptional in character,” the Court 
applied the “Heinatz” test taken from a Texas case, which asks whether the 
substance at issue falls within the “ordinary and natural” meaning of 
“mineral.”59 In addition, the Court looked to both dictionary and statutory 
definitions and concluded that dinosaur fossils do not fall within the 
ordinary and natural definition of “mineral” for purposes of a mineral deed 
and therefore belong to the owners of the surface estate.60 
5. Northern Oil and Gas, Inc. v. Continental Resources, Inc. 
In Northern Oil and Gas, Inc. v. Continental Resources, Inc.,61 the 
Federal District Court for the District of Montana, Billings Division, 
Magistrate Judge Ostby presiding, considered whether operations on 
adjoining land were sufficient to perpetuate a lease into its secondary term. 
Continental Resources (“Continental”) and Northwest Farm Credit Services 
(“NWFCS”) entered into an oil and gas lease whose primary term expired 
September 29, 2013, covering the west half of Section 10 in Richland 
County, Montana.62 Prior to the execution of the lease, the Montana Board 
of Oil and Gas Conservation (“Board”) made Section 10, along with 
                                                                                                                 
 53. No. 14-106-BLG-SPW, 2016 WL 3030929, appeal filed, No. 16-35505 (9th Cir. 
June 20, 2016). 
 54. Id. at *2. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. at *1-2. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. at *8. 
 60. Id.  
 61. No. 14-90-BLG-CSO, 2016 WL 3079692 (D. Mont. May 31, 2016). 
 62. Id. at *1. 
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Section 3––which was not part of the NWFCS lease but is adjacent to 
Section 10––part of a temporary spacing unit for Bakken production.63 
Continental completed a well on Section 3 on September 29, 2013, the last 
day of the primary term of the lease covering Section 10, but no well was 
drilled on Section 10.64 On May 1, 2014, the Board issued an order 
declaring both Sections 3 and 10 part of a permanent spacing unit for 
pooled production from the Bakken/Three Forks Formation.65  
NWFCS filed suit, claiming that the lease on Section 10 had expired 
because Continental failed to commence operations on the leased premises 
prior to the expiration of the primary term.66 Continental argued that 
because Sections 3 and 10 were part of a temporary spacing unit, operations 
on Section 3 amounted to operations on lands pooled with the leased 
premises, and therefore prolonged the lease covering Section 10 into its 
secondary term.67 
MCA § 82-11-202(1)(b) provides that “[o]perations incident to the 
drilling of a well upon any portion of a permanent spacing unit covered by a 
pooling order are considered, for all purposes, the conduct of the operations 
upon each separately owned tract in the spacing unit by the several owners 
of the tracts.”68 Continental cited no similar authority for its position that 
inclusion in a temporary spacing unit had the same effect.69 Since the unit 
covering Section 10 was not made permanent until after the expiration of 
the lease’s primary term, the Court held that the lease had expired on its 
terms.70 
 
                                                                                                                 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. at *2. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at *3. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at *8. 
 69. Id.  
 70. Id. 
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